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Abstract
The mainly used welfare criterion in the social network literature is Bentham´s utilitarian
concept. The shortcomings of this concept are well-known. We compare the outcomes of the
utilitarian concept with the Nash social welfare function. By using a Taylor approximation
we deduce a formula which allows the direct comparison of both concepts. The implications
of welfare considerations of important network formation models are evaluated by using
the multiplicative concept. We introduce a new symmetric connection model which is
related to Nash´s welfare function in the same way as the original model is related to the
utilitarian function. Based on the observation that heavy tail distributions like the power
law distribution and the Pareto distribution can be explained by multiplicative structures
we propose to use multiplicative utility functions in social network models. Furthermore,
multiplicative utility and welfare functions together exhibit favorable characteristics both in
normative and positive terms. Many empirically observed social networks have structures
which are better modelled by multiplicative functions. From the normative perspective,
multiplicative functions might be attractive since the Nash product introduces some form of
justice.
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1 Traditional Welfare Measure
Measuring the welfare of a group of people or a society is at the heart of traditional as well as
modern economics. There are several welfare measures in the literature. The standard concept
among the welfarist functions is Bentham´s utilitarian function which sums up the values of
individual utility functions. The classical counterpart of Bentham´s concept is the minimax
criterion described by Rawls (1971) which implies under weak assumptions an egalitarian
outcome. Both are extreme points of moral philosophy while more pragmatic concepts are
less frequently debated. Traditionally, the success of the utilitarian as well as the egalitarian
welfare function is not emphasized by applied researchers, but ideologists and theorists used the
concepts. The authors of the former type use it for consumption and the latter ones for the
production of scientific contributions.
Until now the standard measure in the social network literature is the utilitarian welfare
function. This welfare function is inherently anchored such that the term efficiency and
utilitarian concept are used synonymously. This terminology is so ingrained that it is pointless
to try to change it. Hence, we follow this notion and extend it below. In social network papers
it might be challenging to proof which network structures are the efficient ones. For instance,
in Bala and Goyal (2000) and Calvo´-Armengol (2004) some difficulties are implicitly mentioned
since the authors restrict some of their results related to the efficiency criterion to specific
functions respectively values and not to a general solution.1 Also the calculation of the efficient
set might be constrained by slow computer processors. However, the optimal utilitarian outcome
is in many situations still one of the less complicated concepts and this is generally true in many
other fields of economics where proofs and the computational task are less demanding. Hence,
we believe that the use of this concept in social network papers2 is mainly based on mathematical
simplicity and not economic reasoning. The attractiveness of the utilitarian welfare function
is closely related to the way utility functions are specified. Sometimes game theorists do not
derive their utility functions from observing the behavior of humans but from the experience
that full-fledged solutions are often obtained out of linearly specified utility functions, while
the detection of properly more realistic but also more complicated specifications of utility
functions are much more involved. Therefore, instead of having realistic but irresolvable models
economists prefer simple models conveying some simple messages. This line of reasoning might
explain the prevalence of the utilitarian concept.
1In the case of the job-contact network model invented by Calvo´-Armengol (2004) not the deterministic but
expected sum of utilities is maximized.
2As well as in other subfields of economics.
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Many researchers who use the utilitarian welfare concept often express their discomfort
about its social implications. However, they continue to use it since they claim it is better to
appraise the efficiency by the utilitarian concept then to put aside the welfare problem at all.
The utilitarian concept abstracts from distributional issues. It only maximizes the sum of all
utilities and allows for arbitrary utility distributions across a set of players. Hence, this criterion
is inappropriate for advising non-economists and it can be an important reason for the lack
of communication between theorists and applied researchers. We propose a different welfare
criterion and compare our results with the utilitarian concept. Thereby, we believe that the
mathematical ease is obtainable if the utility functions are specified in a more realistic way.
Carayol, Roux, and Yildizoglu (2005) propose the use of a genetic algorithm to approximate
the set of efficient networks. This idea might be a promising one. Of course, one shortcoming
of an approximation is the lack of beauty. While beauty has a value for itself it also enhances
our intuitive understanding for outcomes. Another shortcoming of approximation is that an
algorithm might produce misleading results. Carayol, Roux, and Yildizoglu (2005) show that
for the co-author network formation model introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) the used
algorithm is exact at least for small networks. However, it is not able to catch the structure
of the symmetric connection model. Even worse, it seems that the degree of exactness depends
in a nonlinear way on the number of players. Thus, if the algorithm fails sometimes for small
and very stylized network models what do we get for large and really existing social networks?
The findings imply that a lot of additional research seems to be necessary for the application of
algorithm. The use of algorithm might be especially helpful if we consider the applications of
social network methods to large networks or whole economies.
Welfare functions who maximize either the allocation efficiency or the equity are less
interesting from a pragmatic point of view than welfare measure which take into account both
properties. An example of such a welfare function is the Nash product. This product is only
one member of the constant elasticity of substitution class where the risk aversion parameter is
positive and finite. In this class of welfare criterions we chose it because of its simple structure.
The Nash product is also called multiplicative social welfare function and is optimal if the product
of all utilities is maximized. Game theorists who construct bargaining models are familiar with
the Nash product which is often defined as the product of player’s utilities above their reservation
utilities. Nash (1950) showed that the maximization of this product has decent properties in
the context of bargaining among agents. Since it is the unique function satisfying the strong
efficiency, individual rationality, scale covariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
symmetry axiom. Nash’s work was a seminal basis for the foundation of this branch of game
theory.
Of course, in this paper we take the position of a social planner and use the Nash product to
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evaluate the welfare of social networks. Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) as well as, for example,
recently Hanany (2001) used the Nash product as a mean to measure social welfare and showed
its normative implications. In the social network literature Nash is associated with some
equilibrium concepts. To avoid confusion with, for instance, the Pairwise-Nash equilibrium
concept and to emphasize that the Nash product imports some form of justice we call the
multiplicative welfare function the “jefficiency” criterion and call a network which maximizes
this criterion “jefficient”. After introducing our notation in Section 2 we compare in Section
3 some properties of the efficiency and the jefficiency measure in general terms. We are also
able to apply some simple results to well-known social network formation models. In Section
4 we continue the application and comparison of the efficiency and jefficiency criterion and
derive the jefficient networks of the original symmetric connection model as well as the “simple
multiplicative symmetric connection model”. Section 5 concludes by motivating that in many
situations multiplicative utility functions have attractive properties which are complementary
to the jefficiency criterion.
2 Notation
Let N = {1, ..., N} be the finite set of players and the individual player is denoted by i. We
assume through out the paper N ≥ 3. We denote the utilitarian welfare concept byW =∑Ni=1 ui
where ui is the utility level of player i. The jefficiency criterion is defined by J =
∏N
i=1 ui
where ui ≥ 0 for all i. Otherwise J is not defined. This assumption is necessary because
without this assumption negative utility functions might be multiplied by each other and yield
positive outcomes. This contradicts the aim of a social planner.3 Given a utility distribution
we abbreviate the mean utility level by u. Utility vectors of dimension N are denoted by
u and v respectively. The link between player i and j is denoted by ij and a set of links
g = {ij, ik, . . . } describes a whole network structure. If ij is formed then also ji exists which
implies that we consider undirected unweighted networks. Different networks are distinguished
by a subscript gc for c = 1, 2. Some considered network structures are the star gS and the
regular network of degree k gR,k. In a star formation one player the center has links to every
other player while the other players, the peripheral players, have links to the star only. In a
regular network each player has the same number of links. An example for a regular network is
the complete network gR,N−1 denoted by gN where each player i forms N − 1 links. Also the
empty network is a regular network. Another frequently debated network formation is the line
3An alternative specification might be to multiply positive utility functions and divide the absolute value of
negative utility levels, i.e. J =
(∏
i ui
)
/
(∏
j uj
)
where ui > 0 and uj < 0. However, this definition is not
applicable for zero utility levels.
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where gL = {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , iN iN−1. Additional notation which is needed to describe the results
of other papers is introduced below.
3 Efficiency vs. Jefficiency
As is known, J and W are related to each other via the class of CES-functions. The general
form of these functions is
CES =
1
1− ρ
∑
i
[ui(.)]1−ρ (1)
where ρ indicates the aversion towards risk. If ρ = 0 the Benthamite social welfare function W
is attained and for ρ = 1 the CES-functions are completed by the Nash social welfare function.
In general, the larger ρ the higher is the value of equity.
Lemma 1 (Transferable Utility) In a transferable utility world maximizing J requires
maximizing W.
Proof: To maximize J we want distribute the maximum amount of utility units among the set
of players. This implies maximizing W in a first step. 
After W is maximized the maximization of J requires to distribute all utility units equally
among the player set. The reason for this is that
∏N
i=1 u >
∏N
i=1 ui if at least one individual
utility level ui 6= u where
∑N
i=1 ui = Nu and u indicates that all players have the same utility
level.
In a nontransferable utility world the maximization of J takes also into account the equity
criterion. Intuitively, multiplying all utility functions of the whole player set implies that each
player´s utility has some form of externality on the social welfare function. Formally, this
externalities are preserved if we rewrite J as
J = exp
(
N∑
i=1
log(ui)
)
(2)
It is readily seen that the maximization of J yields the same outcome as maximizing log(J) =∑N
i=1 log(ui). Here not the utility sum is maximized but the sum of logarithm utilities. The log
function scales down the welfare weight of high utility levels relative to low levels. This implies
that the externalities initially contained in J are translated into the concavity of the logarithm
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function. Therefore J puts some weight not only on the production of utility like W but takes
also into account some form of equity. A Taylor approximation of log(J) around the mean u
yields further insights.
Proposition 1
log (J) = N
[
log(u) +
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
1
N
(
ui − u
u
)d]
(3)
where we call 1N
∑N
i=1(
ui−u
u )
d the u-standardized dth-moment.
Proof: Using the Taylor-series we can write log(ui) =
∑∞
d=0
log(d)(u¯)
d! (ui − u¯)d where log(d)(u¯)
is the dth derivation with respect to u¯. This can be rewritten as log(ui) = log(u¯) + ui−u¯u¯ +∑∞
d=2
log(d)(u¯)
d! (ui − u¯)d. Setting log(d) u¯ = (−1)d+1 (d−1)!u¯d and summing over each player in the
player set yields the above formula. 
We call the double sum the D-series and say J is approximated up to order D ≤ ∞. If we
also rewrite W = Nu then the first right-hand term of J can be compared to W . Maximizing
Nu yields the same economic outcome than the maximization of Nlog(u). Therefore if the
individual utilities are close to the mean then the D-series is close to zero and the maximization
of J and W yields similar results. However, J takes also into account the distribution of the
utilities. Thus, if the utility levels of the players are spread across a larger range then J yields
different results than W . Taking the exponential on both sides of equation 3 might be helpful
to separate the jefficiency criterion into an allocation part and an part expressing justice.
J = uN + exp
[
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u
u
)d]
(4)
Let us call uN the allocation addend and J − uN the distributional addend. Then the fractions
uN
J and
J−uN
J characterize how important efficiency and justice are in a specific situation. The
Taylor approximation is valid for other values than u. If other values are chosen then the
partition into an efficiency part and a justice part depends on the choice of the value. However,
the choice of u seems attractive because given this choice the justice part can be interpreted as
u-standardized dth-moment.
If we consider the Taylor approximation up to degree D = 4 then
log(J) ≈ N
[
log(u)− 1
2N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)2
+
1
3N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)3
− 1
4N
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)4]
(5)
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follows. This equation shows that log(J) is ceteris paribus lower if the u-standardized variance
and the u-standardized kurtosis of the utility distribution are higher. Furthermore, log(J) is
ceteris paribus higher for right skewed utility distributions than for left skewed distributions. We
apply a simple example to illustrate the preference for right-skewed relative to left-skewed utility
distributions. Let N = 3 and suppose in case (1) the utility levels are u1 = 2, u2 = 2, u3 = 5
and in case (2) the utility levels are u1 = 1, u2 = 4, u3 = 4. In both cases u¯ = 3. 4 Let the
skewness be S(case) = 13
∑N
i=1
(
ui−u¯
u¯
)3 then S(1) = 6 > −6 = S(2). Therefore, we can conclude
that log(J (1)) > log(J (2)). This also holds for the not approximated equation of J since all even
d-terms are identical and all odd d-terms are greater in case (1) than in case (2).
Note that the Taylor-Approximation is only reasonable if the double sum∑∞
d=2
∑N
i=1(−1)d+1 1d 1N
(
ui−u
u
)d
converges for large d. Otherwise the alternating elements
of the sum diverge and the value of J might heavily depend on the order of the approximation
or otherwise stated the approximation is not applicable.
Remark 1 The Taylor approximation is only valid if the series converge and the series exhibits
this property if and only if ui ≤ 2u for each player i.
Proof: From ui ≤ 2u it follows that ui−uu ≤ 1 and applying Leibniz’ Convergence criterion
completes this part of the proof. The series, however, converges only if ui−uu does not diverge.
Therefore we need ui ≤ 2u. 
Another helpful remark simplifies some considerations about different network
characteristics.
Remark 2 The right term of log(J) in Proposition 3
D=∞∑
d=2
N∑
i=1
(−1)d+1 1
d
(
ui − u
u
)d
(6)
is always negative if the series converge.
Proof: Independent of the order of D we find to every odd addend of order d+1 an even addend
of order d. Thus, it suffices to show that
−1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d+1
< 0 (7)
4Furthermore, convergence is guaranteed since max[ui] < 2u¯ in both cases. See Remark .
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holds. Which is true by the convergence of the series. 
Both welfare criteria J and W are also related to each other under specific circumstances.
While it is difficult to show full-fledged results for the general model it is possible to discover
some structure under special circumstances which are discussed below.
Lemma 2 (Dominant Order) Suppose there are two networks g1 and g2 if ui(g1) > ui(g2),
for all i then it holds that both W (g1) > W (g2) and J(g1) > J(g2).
The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 3 (Non-Dominant Order) Suppose there are two networks g1 and g2. Suppose S1
and S2 are a partition of the player set N . Suppose ui(g1) > ui(g2) for all i ∈ S1 and uj(g1) <
uj(g2) for all j ∈ S2. Furthermore we assume
∑
i[ui(g1) − ui(g2)] >
∑
j [uj(g2) − uj(g1)] then
W (g1) > W (g2) but it might hold that J(g1) < J(g2).
Proof: Let upSk =
∏N
i=1 ui and usSk =
∑N
i=1 ui for all i ∈ Sk, k = 1, 2. Then J(g1) =
upS1(g1)upS2(g1) and J(g2) = upS1(g2)upS2(g2). Thus J(g1) < J(g2) can be rewritten as
α1upS2(g1) < upS1(g2)α2 where α1 = usS1(g1)− usS1(g2) > 0 and α2 = usS2(g2)− usS2(g1) > 0
and α1 > α2. Since α1 can be arbitrarily close to α2 our inequality J(g1) < J(g2) is true for
large enough upS1(g2). 
Lemma 4 (Regular Networks) (i) If players are homogenous then the efficient network
among the set of regular networks is also the jefficient network among the set of regular networks
and (ii) if an efficient network is regular then this network is also the jefficient network.
Proof: (i) If players are homogenous and all players have the same position in the network then
W =
∑N
i=1 ui(g) = Nui(g) and J =
∏N
i=1 ui(g) = [ui(g)]
N . This implies that for both criteria
we look for that regular network that produces the maximal utility sum for any player i since all
players are identical. (ii) Lemma 1 implies that in a transferable utility world we first maximize
W and then distribute the utility sum equally across all players. However, if W is maximized
such that all players get the same utility the second step can be omitted and Lemma 1 is also
applicable to the nontransferable utility world. 
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Lemma 4 is applicable to the one-way flow model in Bala and Goyal (2000). In the one-way
flow model information which spreads through networks can only flow to the player who bear
the costs for the existing links. There the efficient network is either the empty network or the
cycle.5 Of course, the empty network is only efficient if the costs to form links are too high.
Otherwise the cycle is the efficient network where every player forms one link and gets the
whole information set available in the set. Given our Lemma 4 we know that the cycle is also
the jefficient network. The same line of reasoning holds for the co-author model explained in
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). If the number of players is even then the efficient network in the
co-author model is the one where each component is formed by two players only. The reason for
this result is that each player gains the maximum amount of utility relative to the number of
links. If a further link is added to one player then the utility of the indirectly connected players
shrinks more than the direct links add to the players who form the link. Thence the welfare
is reduced. Given Lemma 2 we can conclude that the jefficient network is also the network
containing components of pairs of players only.
Another frequently investigated network formation is the star network. There the central
player is connected to N−1 players while the periphery players are only connected to the center.
Let us assume a convergence series as defined above and denote the utilities of both group of
players by uc for the central player and up for the periphery players then
log (J) = N log
[
(N − 1)up + uc
N
]
+
D=∞∑
d=2
(−1)d+1
d
{
(N − 1)(up − uc)d
[
1 + (N − 1)d−1(−1)d]
[(N − 1)up + uc]d
}
which given a fixed number of players depends only on up and uc. It is immediately seen that
log(J) reduces to N log(ui) if and only if up = uc under the assumptions stated. If up 6= uc
then all even d-terms are negative. The odd d-terms are negative if up > uc because since then
as described above a left-skewed utility distribution is evaluated and the d-terms are positive if
up < uc.
The J-star formula can also be reinterpreted in the following way. In a sense it relates an
inequality measure to the total utility sum. Thus, we can rewrite
Lemma 5 (Star Networks) It holds that
log (J) = N log
(
W
N
)
+
D=∞∑
d=2
(−1)d+1
d
(
Γ
W
)d
(N − 1)
[
1 + (N − 1)d−1(−1)d
]
where Γ = up − uc and W = (N − 1)up + uc.
5Bala and Goyal (2000) used the notion wheel while in graph theory the standard term is cycle.
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The Proof requires simply replacing and solving the above equations to the original formula. Γ
can be interpreted as an inequality measure while W is the sum of all utilities. It also holds that
Γ > W . This inequality holds since up−uc < (N −1)up+uc which implies 0 < (N −2)up+2uc.
Given N ≥ 3 the inequality is always fulfilled. This formula and its interpretation is applicable
to any network where only two different utility levels arise.
The results described can also be characterized graphically. The graphs in figure 1 show
the functions W (u) and J(u). Of course, the dotted line representing W is a linear function of
u while J depends not only u but also on the distribution of utilities. Therefore the mapping
represented by the grey field in figure 1 shows the possible values the jefficiency criterion might
take in dependence of u. The maximum J is reached where the utility distribution degenerates
to ui = u for all player i. The minimum is reached if there exist at least one player i such that
ui = 0. The arguments also suggest that for each u2 > u1 it is possible to find a J ′(u2) ≤ J(u1)
where the inequality is strict if u1 > 0.
Figure 1: J and W in dependence of u
Remark 3 Let us perform a mean preserving spread such that the convergence of the series
condition is still maintained. Then such a mean preserving spread reduces J .
The proof is appended.
For a symmetric utility distribution the outcome is immediately proven since all even d-parts
are decreased by a mean preserving spread and odd d-terms are zero for any symmetric utility
distributions.
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4 Jefficiency in the Symmetric Connection Model
A (Multiplicative) Symmetric Connection Model
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced one of the simplest network formation models available
where each player gets utility out of direct and indirect links where more distant links contribute
less. Costs are only paid for direct links. In this model only the empty network, the star, and the
complete network are among the class of efficient networks. If we look for the jefficient networks
we discover a much richer set of networks.
Proposition 2 The set of jefficient networks of the symmetric connection model is different
from the set of efficient networks.
Proof: In the Appendix we show that for N = 4 the line is among the set of jefficient networks
if the costs to form links c are large enough.
It can also be shown that gR,2, gN−ij , g = {12, 13, 23, 24}, gS , and gN is among the jefficient
networks if the number of players is four. However, a general solution is quite involving. Given
Gauss´ fundamental theorem of algebra, we conjecture that the set of jefficient network depends
on the number of players.6
Conjecture 1 In the symmetric connection model the set of jefficient networks is increasing
with the number of players in a network.
The result in proposition 2 shows that the set of jefficient networks has a greater cardinality
than the set of efficient networks in the symmetric connection model. Above we demonstrate
that J is maximal if both equity and the production of utility is taken into account. Hence, we
believe that the set of jefficient networks encompasses at least some regular networks where each
player gets the same utility and some minimal connected networks where the number of links
and therefore the costs of forming links is minimized, and also some mixture of both network
structures.
In Moebert (2006) we defined the class of all symmetric connection models – the
SCM(W)-class – grounded on the utilitarian efficiency criterion7 and showed that the structure
6Gauss’ proof shows that in a polynomial of degree d there are d possible solutions. Some of the solutions
might be complex and some of them might have multiplicity larger than one.
7We call this class the SCM(W)-class which means the class of symmetric connection models based on the
utilitarian welfare criterion.
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of the proof of the corresponding proposition in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) can be used as
a basis for the derivation of a whole class of symmetric connection models. Here we define
a network formation model which is closely related to the SCM(W)-class. We call this model
“simple multiplicative symmetric connection model”.8 The idea of this network formation model
relies on the (original) symmetric connection model mentioned above. The “simple multiplicative
symmetric connection model” exhibits the following utility function
ui = δ
∞∑
e=1
le
e
c−l1 (10)
where le indicates the distance of player i to all other players, δ is the utility of direct respectively
indirect links and c are the costs of forming direct links. It is possible to show that the
maximization of J leads to a simple result which is similar to both the maximization of W
in the original and in the simple additive symmetric connection model.
Proposition 3 The jefficient network is
(a) the complete network if c < δ0.5
(b) the star if δ0.5 < c < δ0.5+0.25N
(c) the empty network if c > δ0.5+0.25N .
Proof: (a) If direct links are more valuable than indirect links then δc > δ
0.5 which implies that
the fully connected network gN is formed if c < δ0.5. (b) Let us call the upper bound of a
connected component with m players and k ≥ m − 1 links JU = ( δc )2k(δ0.5)[m(m−1)−2k]. The
jefficiency measure of the star is JS = ( δc )
2(m−1)(δ0.5)(m−2)(m−1). Since JS ≥ JU for δ0.5 < c the
star is jefficient among the set of connected components. (c) The star is just restricted by the
emtpy network g0 which is jefficient if 1 > ( δc )
2(m−1)(δ0.5)(m−2)(m−1) which can be reduced to
c > δ0.5+0.25m .
It might be helpful to mention that the proof here is only nearly complete. However, our
proof here has the same structure as the proof who identifies the set of efficient network in
the original symmetric connection model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Actually, both
the original proof as our result above rely on the assumption that a shortest indirect link of
distance two spends more utility than any other indirect link of greater distance. Of course, in
both network formation models this assumption is readily fulfilled. It might also be important
to expose that there exists a close relation between the SCM(W)-class and the multiplicative
network formation model here which might be a member of a whole class of multiplicative
symmetric connection models.
8In accordance to the “simple additive symmetric connection model” introduced in Moebert (2006).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we applied a well-known welfare measure, the Nash product, also called jefficiency
criterion, to social network formation models. We also derived several relationships between
the standard efficiency criterion and the jefficiency criterion. In particular, by using a Taylor
approximation we were able to deduce a formula which improves our understanding of the
jefficiency criterion relative to the utilitarian welfare measure. We argued that the derivation of
efficient outcomes is easier to perform if utility functions are linearly specified. We also showed,
by means of examples, that replacing the efficiency criterion by the jefficiency criterion leads to
a larger variety of network structures in the symmetric connection model. However, the results
of the “simple multiplicative symmetric connection model” demonstrated that multiplicative
utility functions9 might lead to simple welfare outcomes if welfare is measured by the jefficiency
criterion. Hence, the evaluation of multiplicative specified utility functions with respect to
the jefficiency criterion might be a natural choice both from a mathematical point of view to
get relatively simple results and from a normative point of view since the jefficiency criterion
introduces some form of justice into the social network literature.
The main advantage of the use of multiplicative utility functions, however, might be that
multiplicative utility functions exhibit characteristics which can explain some features of really
existing social networks. For instance, physicists among other Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi
(1999) have shown that a general characteristic of networks is that the distributions of links obeys
the power-law or similar distributions. This kind of link distributions characterized by fat tails
is also found in social networks. For instance, Goyal, van der Leij, and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004)
investigated that the real existing co-author network of economists also exhibits fat tails for
the period 1970 to 2000. Mitzenmacher (2003) has shown that one necessity for the derivation
of such distributions is the introduction of multiplicative structures. Economists who search
for network formation models who describe the reality in an appropriate way might therefore
prefer the modelling of multiplicative utility functions instead of the linear functions used often
in today’s specifications. Also in research fields which are closely related to the social network
literature like random graph theory and Markov chain theory many important results possess
multiplicative structures.
Intuitively, multiplicative utility functions are directly justifiable by the simple observation
that the survival of humans require the availability of several goods like air, water, food, and
love. Without any of these resources human mankind is unable to survive. Hence, if only one
9We call utility functions “additive” respectively “multiplicative” if they exhibit the “additive separability”
respectively “multiplicative separability” properties. For further details see Moebert (2006).
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of these resources is not available for some players then the utility levels of players in social
network theories should be zero and not above zero as in additively specified utility functions.10
6 Appendix
Proof (Remark 3): Let N+ and N− be a partition on the player set. If i ∈ N+ then vi > ui
and if i ∈ N− then vi ≤ ui. Therefore, the utility vector v defines our mean preserving spread
of u. Independent of the order of D we find to every odd addend of order d+1 an even addend
of order d (see Remark 6). Therefore, we just have to show that
−1
d
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d+1
> −1
d
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u
u
)d
+
1
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u
u
)d+1
(11)
This can be rewritten as
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d
− d
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d+1
<
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u
u
)d
− d
d+ 1
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u
u
)d+1
(12)
and
N∑
i=1
(
ui − u
u
)d
− d
d+ 1
(
ui − u
u
)d+1
<
N∑
i=1
(
vi − u
u
)d
− d
d+ 1
(
vi − u
u
)d+1
(13)
follows. Taking the derivative of f(a) = ad − d(d + 1)−1ad+1 with respect to a yields f ′(a) =
ad−1 − ad and we have a root at a = 0. If a > 0 then ad−1 > ad and if a < 0 then ad−1 < ad.
This implies that f(a) is maximal if a = 1 or a = 0. Hence, a mean preserving spread reduces
J . 
Proof (Proposition 2): For N = 4 there are eleven possible network formations in the
symmetric connection model. Four out of these networks, for example g0, have at least one
player who is not connected to anyone else. Therefore the jefficiency measure of these networks
are zero. The following networks are left: gR,1, gL, g = {12, 13, 23, 24}, gS , gR,2, gN−ij , and gN
where gN−ij describes any network where 2−1[N(N − 1)] − 1 links are formed. Let c = δ then
in all networks where one player has only direct and no indirect links have a jefficiency measure
of zero. Only JL and JR,2 are greater than zero and if c = δ then JL > JR,2. 
10Of course, this statement holds not only for the social network literature but for many game theoretical
models.
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